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Abstract—Situation awareness (SA), a state in the mind of a 
human, is essential to conduct decision-making activities. It is 
about the perception of the elements in the environment, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their 
status in the near future. Two decades of investigation and 
analysis of accidents have showed that SA was behind of many 
serious large-scale technological systems’ accidents. This 
emphasizes the importance of SA support systems development 
for complex and dynamic environments. This paper presents a 
fuzzy dynamic Bayesian network-based situation assessment 
approach to support the operators in decision making process in 
hazardous situations. The approach includes a dynamic Bayesian 
network-based situational network to model the hazardous 
situations where the existence of the situations can be inferred by 
sensor observations through the SCADA monitoring system 
using a fuzzy quantizer method. In addition to generate the 
assessment result, a fuzzy risk estimation method is proposed to 
show the risk level of situations. Ultimately a hazardous 
environment from U.S. Chemical Safety Board investigation 
reports has been used to illustrate the application of proposed 
approach. 
Keywords—situation awareness; situation assessment; dynamic 
Bayesian network; fuzzy sets 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution many 
serious large-scale technological systems’ accidents that had 
grave consequences, such as those of Three Mile Island, 
Bhopal and Chernobyl, have primarily been attributed to 
human error. In fact, in the vast majority of these accidents the 
human operator was striving against significant challenges 
such as data overload and the task of working with a complex 
system. Actually, the persons are not the cause of these errors 
but they have inherited the problems and difficulties from the 
technologies that engineers have created. Operators generally 
have no difficulty in physically performing their tasks, and no 
difficulty in knowing what is the correct thing to do, but they 
are stressed by the task of understanding what is going on in 
the situation [1]. Over the last two decades, great deal of 
research has been undertaken in the area of Situation awareness 
(SA). 
Situation awareness can be described as knowing and 
understanding what is going on around you and predicting how 
things will change. In control of complex systems where 
multiple goals should be pursued simultaneously, multiple 
tasks need operator’s attention, the operator’s performance is 
under high time stress and negative consequences associated 
with poor performance is expected, SA is quite likely to be 
behind many accidents. On 23 March 2005, for instance, 15 
workers were killed and 170 injured in the explosion at a 
refinery located in south-east Texas. An important factor 
identified in this catastrophic accident was the difficulty 
experienced by the operator in maintaining an accurate SA 
while monitoring a complex, dynamic environment. 
 Today in technological systems, operators have often been 
moved to a control room far away from the physical process, 
where automated systems pass more and more information to 
them, so they have to handle more data and more 
responsibility. In the presence of all this data, operators are 
finding that they are even less aware than before about the 
situations they are controlling. This has led to a huge gap 
between the massive amount of data produced and 
disseminated and the operator’s ability to effectively assimilate 
the required data and to make timely, accurate decisions [2]. 
This emphasizes the importance of designing human-computer 
interaction (HCI) to support SA in dynamic environments. 
This paper considers the applicability of SA concept to 
safety of complex systems where the degree of automation and 
complexity are increasing and the number of operators is 
decreasing, and each operator must be able to comprehend and 
respond to an ever increasing amount of available risky status 
and alert information. This paper introduces a fuzzy dynamic 
Bayesian network-based situation assessment approach which 
includes three major parts. First, it includes a fuzzy quantizer 
method to discrete the observable variables extracted from 
sensors which will be used as soft evidences in the next part. 
Second, it enjoys a situational network based on dynamic 
Bayesian network (DBN) to model the hazardous situations. 
Third, the approach uses a fuzzy risk estimation method to 
generate the assessment result and show that the risk level is 
acceptable or not.  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents 
background and related works. Section III describes the fuzzy 
dynamic Bayesian network-based situation assessment 
approach. A case study from U.S. Chemical Safety Board 
investigation report is presented in Section IV. Finally, 
conclusion and future work is provided in Section V. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS 
A. Situation Awareness 
A situation is a collection of objects which have 
relationships with one another and the environment, and an 
object is a physical entity that is within the grasp of the senses 
[3]. Situation awareness can be described as “the perception of 
the elements in the environment within a volume of time and 
space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection 
of their status in the near future” [2]. This SA model follows a 
chain of information processing, from perception, through 
interpretation, to projection. The levels of SA are as follows:  
 Perception: Perception includes the sensory detection of 
important cues (e.g. status, attributes, and dynamic 
elements) in the environment. 
 Comprehension: Comprehension is the understanding 
of the meaning or significance of that information in the 
light of goals. This process results in a comprehensive 
picture of the environment.  
 Projection: Projection involves extrapolating 
information forward in time to understand how it will 
affect near future states of the environment. The higher 
level of SA provides a timely and effective manner for 
operators to function appropriately, even with very 
complex and challenging tasks. 
B. Situation Assessment 
Situation awareness is a state of knowledge that has to be 
distinguished from the processes underlying the achievement 
of SA, which should be addressed as situation assessment [1]. 
The situation assessment models describe basic principles and 
general features about how people process information or 
interact with the environment to attain their SA. In fact, 
awareness information for a situation is derived as the results 
of situation assessment. Since SA is regarded as a dynamic and 
collaborative process, assessing a situation is often required 
data integration or called data fusion with support of computer 
based intelligent techniques [4-7]. The enhancement of 
operators’ SA in complex systems is a major design goal in 
developing operator interfaces, automation concepts and 
training plans in a wide variety of fields [4, 7, 8]. As SA aims 
to predict the status of a situation in the near future, which is 
the third level of the SA model, proper and effective situation 
assessment approaches and tools to conduct the prediction, is 
required. For example, many studies have reported that 
machine learning techniques could be an effective method for 
intelligent prediction by extracting rules from previous data to 
generate new assessment results [4], however their use has 
been limited, possibly because of the lack of rich training data 
for this problem [9]. In command and control applications, 
Bayesian networks have been considered widely in situations 
assessment configuration [10]. Some authors considered 
computational method, but usually computational approaches 
often do not satisfactorily handle all forms of uncertainty, 
therefore, some cognitive approaches which use the fuzzy logic 
system to address the limitations of traditional models in 
producing the full range of human behaviors, have been 
developed [11]. 
C. Dynamic Bayesian Networks 
A BN is a directed acyclic graph whose nodes correspond 
to random variables and the arcs between nodes represent 
dependencies or direct causal influences between variables. 
The force of these dependencies is represented by conditional 
probabilities. Conventional BN can be considered as a 
representation of static cause-effect relations among objects in 
a situation. The BN represents the joint probability distribution 
P(X) of variables X={X1,…,Xn}, included in the network as: 
                  
 
   
                                       
where Pa(Xi) is the parent set of Xi for any i=1,…,n. If Pa(Xi) is 
an empty set, then Xi is a root node and                     
denotes its prior probability. BN takes advantage of Bayes 
theorem to update the prior occurrence probability of objects 
given new information, called evidence E, thus yielding the 
posteriors. This new information usually becomes available 
during the operational life of a system, including occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of the objects [12]: 
       
      
    
 
      
        
                                
The static BN can be extended to a dynamic BN (DBN) 
model by introducing relevant temporal dependencies that 
capture the dynamic behaviors of the domain variables 
between representations of the static network at different times. 
Two types of dependencies can be distinguished in a DBN: 
contemporaneous dependencies and non-contemporaneous. 
Contemporaneous dependencies refer to arcs among nodes that 
represent variables within the same time period. Non-
contemporaneous refer to arc between nodes which represent 
variables at different times. A DBN is defined as a pair 
          where B1 is a BN which define the prior 
distribution P(X1) and 2TBN is a two-slice temporal BN with 
                
       
   
 
   
                        
where   
  is a node at time slice t and      
   is the set of parent 
nodes which can be in time slice t or t-1. The nodes in the first 
slice of a 2TBN do not have any parameters associated with 
them, but each node in the second slice has an associated 
conditional probability distribution (CPD) for continues 
variables or conditional probability table (CPT) for discrete 
variables, which defines     
       
    for all    . The arcs 
between slices are from left to right, reflecting the casual flow 
of time. If there is an arc from     
  to   
 , this node is called 
persistent. The arcs within a slice are arbitrary. Directed arcs 
within a slice represent “instantaneous” causation. The 
semantics of a DBN can be defined by “unrolling” the 2TBN 
until there are T time-slices. The resulting joint distribution is 
then given by: 
              
       
   
 
   
 
   
                             
Several inference methods for a DBN can be used such as 
clustering and unrolled junction tree [13]. 
III. A FUZZY DYNAMIC BAYESIAN NETWORK-BASED 
SITUATION ASSESSMENT APPROACH 
The main goal of our approach is to provide an actionable 
base for operators to monitor the hazardous situations and be 
aware of their risk level, and take appropriate actions to reduce 
the risk to an acceptable level. The approach consists three 
major parts as shown in Fig. 1.  
Fig. 1. A fuzzy DBN-based situation assessment approach. 
A. A Fuzzy Quantizer Method 
This part based on online condition and process monitoring 
system provides the current state of the observable variables, 
conducts a discretization process and transfers the result to the 
next part. According to condition and process monitoring, each 
observable variable value is obtained from field sensors based 
on SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) 
systems. As the observable variables extracted from sensors are 
continuous, to use them in DBN, a discretization process is 
required. In general, mapping continuous variable to discrete 
one can be done with a quantizer like a fuzzy partitioning. 
Definition 1 (Fuzzy random variable): Let          be a 
probability space,      the set of fuzzy numbers in   with 
compact supports and  is a mapping       . Then  is 
a fuzzy random variable if and only if given    ,      is 
a random interval for any         where      is a  -level 
set of the fuzzy set     [14]. 
Definition 2 (Fuzzy state): Let the crisp state set   consist of 
the states           . Then, each fuzzy state can be written 
as a vector               , where         . This way, 
each fuzzy state can be considered as a possibility distribution 
or alternatively as a fuzzy set       , (     the set of all 
fuzzy subsets defined for  ) determining the degree    by 
which the system participates in each crisp state   , provided it 
is in the current fuzzy state q [15]. 
 Now suppose                be the set of variables in 
a BN. If the variable    is a continuous variable then it can be 
transformed into a fuzzy random variable   . The 
corresponding set    can be utilized to map the variable Xi to 
fuzzy states: 
                                               (5) 
where      is the j-th fuzzy state and m denotes the number of 
the fuzzy states, and fuzzy state      can be defined as 
following: 
                                               (6) 
where          is the membership function of fuzzy state  
 
  , 
   is the frame of Xi, and x denotes the value of variable Xi. 
For a continues variable   , its condition probability in the BN 
with its parent can be replaced by             : 
                                         (7) 
where   is the corresponding fuzzy random variable defined 
by Xi. For a node without parents, soft evidence is equivalent 
to modifying its prior probability; otherwise, soft evidence on 
a variable Xi is represented by a conditional probability vector  
P(Xi=x|Hi) for i=1,2,...,m, where Hi denotes the hypothesis 
that the true state is the i-th state. To simplify the inference 
process for continues variables, consider the fuzzy random 
variable    with states                   . Define Hj, 
j=1,2,…,m as hypotheses that   is in state     . The results of 
fuzzy function member           j=1,2,…,m form the soft 
evidence vector: 
                                                       (8) 
The          is approximately considered to be equivalent to 
the condition probability               Then the soft 
evidence vector can be defined as: 
                                        (9) 
where            represents that the observed value of Wi 
is “1” if the state is      , which is indeed the probability 
              [16]. 
B. A DBN-Based Situational Network 
A situation is a collection of physical or conceptual objects, 
or both which have relationships to each other and 
environment. The emphasis in situation definition is on 
relationships. The relations are viewed from the point of view 
of a thing (i.e. focal object), and how other things in the 
surroundings are related to it. In this part a DBN-based 
situational network is developed to model the situations of 
interest into a network while every situation is modeled by a 
simple BN, based on constitutive objects.  To achieve the goal, 
two types of hazardous situations are considered: 1) first level 
situations: the objects of a situation and their interactions may 
create a hazard; 2) higher level situations: relationships among 
situations may produce a hazard. To find the situations of 
interest, hazard identification methods and experts’ knowledge 
should be used. In many areas, hazardous situations have been 
obtained through design and implement phases and various 
models have been developed to identify them. For example, 
HAZOP is one of the most powerful methods available and has 
been well described in the literature.  
Suppose the configuration space   is defined by all 
possible physical and conceptual objects. Mathematically, a 
situation at time t can be modeled as a statement about a 
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where the       is the current risk level of the situation and is 
defined: 
                                           (11) 
where       is the probability of the situation at a time t and 
depends on the objects of the subset space   : 
                                               (12) 
and       is the severity of  the situation. Due to this modeling, 
the existence of situation is inferred based on information in 
the world i.e. the observable variables and objects of 
configuration space. The first level situation can be illustrated 
by a simple BN based on its objects. Usually the BN begins by 
root nodes that include the basic objects. It follows by 
intermediate nodes, a pivot node and leaf nodes. The pivot 
node is the focal object which delegates the situation, and 
relations among root nodes and pivot node defines the 
relationships among the objects. The leaf nodes are safety 
barriers which are some physical objects of the environment 
and will connect to each other if there is relation between their 
performances. Also one of the leaf nodes may be a 
consequence node which has some states, and shows the 
possible accidents of the situation. There are also situations, 
which can only be inferred by observing the real word over a 
period of time. Although the situations are characterized by 
information collected over a time-period, they only exist at a 
special point in time. Their existence in the next time-point has 
to be verified again. 
The higher level situations can be inferred from other 
situations. Several situations can exist in parallel or the 
existence of one situation can exclude the existence of another 
situation. Fig. 2 shows an example network of situations. As 
can be seen, there are four situations of interest, namely A, B, 
C and D, where A and B belong to first level situations 
category. They can be inferred directly from objects O1, O2 and 
O3 and situations C and D are higher level situations and their 
existence is dependent on the existence of lower level 
situations.  
 
Fig. 2. A network of situations. 
The existence probability of first level situation is inferred 
directly from the values of the configuration space, and the 
probability of higher level situation is calculated based on the 
existence probability of other situations. This also includes 
temporal dependencies, i.e. that the existence probability of an 
inferred situation in future can be supported by the earlier 
existence of the situation itself. The complete modeling of the 
dependencies results a network of situations. The DBN 
parameters are defined using historical data and prior 
knowledge or an expert’s judgment. 
C. A Fuzzy Risk Estimation Method 
While the previous part provides the modeling of 
situational network and prior and posterior probability of 
situations and their objects, this part generates the assessment 
level of risk for every situation and shows that the current risk 
level is acceptable or not. As such estimation is highly 
subjective and related to inexact and vague information, the 
application of fuzzy set theory is appropriate. Generally, the 
risk model calculation follows a multi-step process: 1) 
Estimation of the situation likelihood, 2) Estimation of the 
situation severity, and 3) Estimation of the situation risk 
To determine the prior and posterior likelihood, the DBN-
based situational network provides the required quantities. The 
quantitative analysis of a DBN can proceed along two lines, the 
forward (or predictive) analysis and backward (or diagnostic) 
analysis. The occurrence of a hazardous situation may 
potentially lead to a broad range of consequences, some of 
which may probabilistically be undesirable events. Generally 
the loss of a consequence may be categorized into four groups; 
asset loss, human fatality, environmental loss, and confidence 
or reputation loss. It is useful for all four components to be 
converted and expressed in a common currency such as money 
for potential comparison and aggregation in order to provide a 
coherent view of the totality of loss associated with a 
hazardous situation. 
To estimate the risk level we use a fuzzy logic system 
(FLS) as shown in Fig.3. FLS consists of three steps: 
fuzzification of the input variables, fuzzy inference process and 
defuzzification.  In the fuzzification process, the fuzzy sets are 
formed for all variables. The inference engine takes into 
account the input variables i.e. likelihood and severity and uses 
a risk matrix. The inference process is based on fuzzy logic 
operations which are the implication in each single rule and the 
aggregation from all rules. All output functions returned by the 
implication process for each rule are combined into a single 
output fuzzy set. Finally, the output fuzzy set of risk is 
defuzzified into a crisp value. This value is subsequently used 
for the risk evaluation category [17]. 
 
Fig. 3. Structures of FLS.  
      A fuzzy set is determined by the membership function e.g. 
triangular, trapezoidal and Gaussian. However the selection of 
a function essentially depends on the variable characteristics, 
available information and expert’s knowledge. In this paper, 
the shapes of the membership functions are defined as a 
combination of trapezoidal and triangular numbers to simplify 
the operation and increase the sensitivity in some bounds. The 
Alpha level cuts (α) provide values of the variable for a 
specific degree of membership function. The values of degree 
of membership “1” and “0” are used to characterize the fuzzy 
sets for each variable. Table I-III present fuzzification of 
variables and Fig. 4 illustrates the proposed fuzzy sets. The 
fuzzy inference engine takes into account the input variables 
and logic relations between them included 25 rules as shown 
in Table IV, and uses fuzzy logic operations to generate the 
output. Mamdani's fuzzy inference method is the most 
commonly seen fuzzy methodology. The characteristics of the 
Mamdani model is described in Table V [18]. 
 
TABLE I: FUZZIFICATION OF LIKELIHOOD. 
Set Linguistic term α level cuts  
  1-level cut 0-level cut 
VL Very likely 1e-007, 1 3e-007 
L Likely 3e-007 5e-007, 1e-007 
E Even 5e-007 7e-007, 3e-007 
U Unlikely 7e-007 9e-007, 5e-007 
VU Very Unlikely 1e-006, 9e-007  7e-007 
Universe of discourse: (10-6-100) 
 
 
TABLE II: FUZZIFICATION OF SEVERITY. 
Set Linguistic term α level cuts  
  1-level cut 0-level cut 
N Negligible 0, 6.25E+05 2.5E+06 
MI Minor 2.5E+06 6.25E+05, 5E+06 
M Medium 5E+06 2.5E+06, 7.5E+06 
MA Major 7.5E+06 5E+06, 9.375E+06 
C Catastrophic 9.375E+06, 1E+07 7.5E+06 
Universe of discourse: (0-107) 
 
 
TABLE III: FUZZIFICATION OF RISK. 
Set Linguistic term α level cuts  
  1-level cut 0-level cut 
A Acceptable 1 2 
TA Tolerable acceptable 2 1, 3 
TNA Tolerable not acceptable 3 2, 3.85 
NA Not acceptable 3.85, 4 3 
Universe of discourse: (1-4) 
 
 
TABLE IV: RISK MATRIX. 
 Severity 










VL TNA TNA NA NA NA 
L TA TNA TNA NA NA 
E A TA TNA NA NA 
U A A TA TNA NA 
VU A A TA TNA TNA 
TABLE V: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MAMDANI MODEL. 
Operation Operator Formula 
Union (OR) MAX 
                      




                      
             
Implication  MIN                       
Aggregation MAX  
Defuzziﬁcation CENTROID         
           
         
 
       value of the resultant membership function. 
      = value of the membership function where the input belongs to the 
fuzzy set A. 
z = abscissa value, (      is the ordinate). 
Fig. 4. Membership functions of variables. 
IV. A CASE STUDY: APPLICATION IN A MIXING TANK  
To illustrate the implementation of proposed approach in a 
real environment, an open top tank which is used for mixing a 
flammable liquid, is chosen. In similar situation, the ignition of 
a vapor cloud generated by mixing and heating a flammable 
liquid, one person was killed and two employees were injured 
and caused significant business interruption. The accident 
happened when an operator was mixing and heating a 
flammable mixture of heptane and mineral spirits in a 2,200-
gallon open top tank equipped with steam coils (Fig. 5) and the 
operator could not maintain accurate SA until the vapor 
overflowed from the tank. [19].  
A. The Case Description 
The environment includes a tank which is equipped with 
steam coils that supplies required heat for the mixing process, a 
temperature controller includes a temperature sensor and a 
pneumatic control unit, and the steam valves which are 
operated based on the mixture temperature. Also there are 
some safety systems which include a sprinkler system, an 




local and an area exhaust ventilation systems which are 
assumed that have enough capacity to collect a huge volume of 
vapor. The sprinkler system and the fire alarm system have 
been designed that if a fire occurs or if there is accumulated 
vapor, they reduce the damage. An operator checks the 
temperature using an infrared thermometer, and monitors the 
situation and conducts appropriate actions when it is necessary. 
Fig. 5.  Mixing tank environment [15]. 
B. Situations of Interest 
There are some possible hazardous situations in the 
environment which threaten the system. As the investigation 
report shows the important hazardous situations are as follow: 
 SAV=Accumulated vapor in the production building 
 SHT= High temperature inside the tank 
 SIV=Inadequate building ventilation 
The first situation is not directly inferable from the objects 
i.e. it is “higher level situation” and it has to be defined by 
some dependencies to first level situations. Table VI shows the 
safety barriers and consequence node which are affected by 
S
AV
. The second and third situations can be inferred from their 
contributor objects and observable variables i.e. they are “first 
level situation”, and to assess them, some physical and 
conceptual objects are determined as shown in Table VII-VIII  
respectively [12]. 
TABLE VI: SAV OBJECTS AND SYMBOLS. 
Objects Symbol Failure Probability 
Ignition Barrier I 0.1000 
Alarm System A 0.0013 
Sprinkler System P 0.04000 
Consequences C NA 
 
TABLE VII: SIV OBJECTS AND SYMBOLS. 
Objects Symbol Failure Probability 
Belt B 0.0500 
Fan F 0.0100 
Duct Plugging D 0.0010 
TABLE VIII: SHT OBJECTS AND SYMBOLS. 
Objects Symbol Failure Probability 
Operator O 0.0200 
Infrared Thermometer T 0.0468 
Sensor S 0.0400 
Pneumatic Unit PU 0.2015 
Temperature Measurement System TMS 0.0658 
Manual Steam Valve MSV 0.0243 
Automatic Steam Valve ASV 0.0276 
Temperature Control System TCS 0.2334 
Manual Temperature Control MTC 0.0885 
Automatic Temperature Control ATC 0.2549 
C. The Observable Variables 
As noted, there is a sensor which reports the temperature of 
the inside of the tank every minute. Also there is an 
environment temperature sensor which shows the temperature 
of the production unit after a while repeatedly. The SCADA 
monitoring system transfers the updated information about 
these variables to our approach where they can store in 
database and fuzzily get ready as inference evidences to use in 
next DBN-base situational network. 
The process for making Super Clean and Tilt required 
several hours of mixing and heating, and it needs to be adjusted 
the temperature controller to maintain the temperature at 73ºC. 
The environment temperature in normal operation is about 
35ºC. The value ranges of temperature variables are divided 
into two fuzzy states include Safe and Hazardous, and their 
membership functions are determined as follow as well as 
showed in Fig. 6: 
 The temperature of the inside of the tank (ToI): 
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 The temperature of the production building (ToB): 
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D. Structure of the DBN-Based Situational Network  
 A DBN-based situational network is developed and 
illustrated in Fig. 7. The temporal arc is pointing to the S
AV
 
situation itself as it is assumed that the situation is formed after 
a time interval, which is longer than a minute. The 
interpretation is that the vapor is accumulated when the high 
temperature last for a while inside the tank and the ventilation 













Fig. 7. The DBN-based situational network. 
At the beginning, the prior probability of the higher level 
situation i.e. S
AV
, is set to “1” for safe state and “0” for 
hazardous state as it is assumed that the environment is safe at 
the start time. To establish other parameters, namely 
conditional probabilities of the network, historical data and 
expert’s judgment are used. The CPTs of SAV, SHT and SIV are 
shown in Tables IX, X and XI, and other CPTs are omitted as 
they are set in similar way.  
TABLE IX: CPT OF P(SAV| SAV, SHT, SIV). 
SAV SHT SIV SAV=Hazardous SAV=Safe 
Hazardous Hazardous Hazardous 0.95 0.05 
Hazardous Hazardous Safe 0.6 0.4 
Hazardous Safe Hazardous 0.4 0.6 
Hazardous Safe Safe 0.05 0.95 
Safe Hazardous Hazardous 0.95 0.05 
Safe Hazardous Safe 0.05 0.95 
Safe Safe Hazardous 0.05 0.95 
Safe Safe Safe 0.05 0.95 
 
TABLE X: CPT OF P(SIV| D, F, B). 
D F B SIV=Hazardous SIV=Safe 
Failure Failure Failure 1 0 
Failure Failure Success 1 0 
Failure Success Failure 1 0 
Failure Success Success 1 0 
Success Failure Failure 1 0 
Success Failure Success 1 0 
Success Success Failure 1 0 
Success Success Success 0 1 
TABLE XI: CPT OF P(SHT| MTC, ATC). 
MTC ATC SHT=Hazardous SHT=Safe 
Failure Failure 1 0 
Failure Success 0 1 
Success Failure 0 1 
Success Success 0 1 
 
E. Evaluation of the Proposed Approach 
On the morning of June 14, 2006, the internal temperature 
of mixing tank and production unit started to increase in which 
the former has deviated from normal value at 9:16 AM while 
the later has deviated from normal value at 9:24 AM. The trend 
of observable variables for 60 minutes is illustrated in Fig. 8. 
These data can be interpreted as ground truth data to evaluate 
the proposed system’s performance.  
Fig. 8. The observable variables. 
By assigning the primary probabilities into the DBN-based 
situational network, one minute after the start of period i.e. 
9:01 AM, the probabilities of S
AV
 consequences are calculated 
as shown in Table XII. As can be seen, the safe state is the 
most probable consequence of S
AV
. The total loss of S
AV
 i.e. its 
severity can be calculated by multiplication of the probabilities 
and losses of consequences which is about $2.56E+04. The 
probability of S
AV
 at that time is 0.05, therefore the estimated 
risk level is 1.3 which means the current risk level of S
AV
 is 





, the accumulated vapor can be considered as their 
consequence which its degree of loss is about $1E+06. 
TABLE XII: THE CONSEQUENCES OF SAV. 
Consequence Symbol Loss ($) Probability 
Explosion C1 5E+06 2.60E-06 
Fire (moderate damage)  C2 3E+06 0.0020 
Fire (high damage) C3 4E+06 3.90E-06 
Fire (low damage) C4 2E+06 0.0030 
Vapor cloud with possibility of 
ignition 
C5 1E+06 0.0100 
Safe evacuation (near miss) C6 1E+05 0.0349 
Safe state  C7 0 0.9500 
The observable variables get ready fuzzily using (13)-(16) 
as soft evidences every minute. By assigning the fuzzy soft 
evidences into the DBN-based situational network the posterior 
probabilities of the situations are updated during the period as 
shown in Fig. 9. As can be seen from the figure, the S
HT
 
situation is hazardous from minutes 16 to 31and the situation 
S
IV
 gets hazardous from minutes 24 to 28 as it was expected 





due to observable variables. In parallel the risk estimation 
component shows that the risk level of S
HT
 is 2.95 i.e. tolerable 
not acceptable (TNA) from minutes 16 to 31, and the risk level 
of S
IV
 is tolerable not acceptable (TNA) during minutes 24 to 
28, as shown in Fig. 9. As it was assumed that the local and 
area ventilation systems have ability to evacuate the vapor, the 
risk level of S
AV
 is acceptable (A) from minutes 17 to 25, 
exactly before ventilation system malfunction, then its risk 
level has raised from minutes 25 and reached a peak at 3.1 
which means it is not acceptable (NA). 
Fig. 9. The posterior probabilities and risk levels of situations. 
The system is set to make an alarm for every situation 
which has risk level more than 2.5 i.e. tolerable not acceptable 
(TNA). At 9:16 AM when the risk level of S
HT
 raised the 
system shows that the most probable explanation is the failure 
of pneumatic unit (PU), but an inspection at 9:18 AM 
determined the valid performance of PU then with new 
evidence (success of PU) system showed that the failure of 
sensor is the most probable factor. This presents the system 
ability to support the operator to find the most probable 
explanation leading to an abnormal or hazardous state of a 
situation.  
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presented a fuzzy dynamic Bayesian network-
based situation assessment approach based on a fuzzy 
quantizer method, a DBN-based situational network and a 
fuzzy risk estimation method. As it was shown, the DBN-based 
situational network provides useful graphical models that meet 
the requirements for a practical SA system. The Bayesian 
probability framework facilitates the inclusion of background 
(prior) knowledge and the updating of this when new 
information is available from SCADA monitoring system. In 
addition, to generate the assessment, a fuzzy risk estimation 
method was developed to show the risk level of situations.  
Today in many safety-critical systems such as chemical 
plants and nuclear power plants, the safety of system is 
supervised by several operators who are the members of a 
team. They have a particular goal to accomplish, they play a 
specific role in interacting with elements in the task 
environment and they have a limited amount of time to achieve 
the goal, so the future direction of the research is to extend the 
proposed system into a distributed system applying the team 
SA concept. 
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